Brexit and UK climate leadership: The emerging opportunities and challenges
Introduction

This briefing seeks to act as a discussion starter on the various ways in which the UK’s departure from the EU (Brexit) may impact on the UK’s ability to deliver ambitious and bold climate policy in the coming years, and to incentivise positive action on climate internationally. It covers a number of key areas of EU-UK collaboration, but it does not seek to be an exhaustive overview of the implications of Brexit.

On 31 December 2020, the UK completed its separation from the EU. The end of this long and close relationship brings with it a set of opportunities and challenges. No longer a member of the EU, the UK is free to forge its own alliances and make decisions without needing to reach a consensus with 27 other countries. As a result, it will be able to react more decisively and with greater speed on issues that the government regards as requiring bold and urgent action, such as implementing economic sanctions or setting ambitious targets on climate. One recent high-profile example of the benefits to the UK of taking a different approach to the EU has been the success of the UK’s Covid-19 vaccination programme, contrasted against the challenges faced by the EU scheme. Although EU member states did not have to join the EU vaccine scheme, all 27 of them chose to do so.

However, the opportunities associated with the UK's new freedom are closely entwined with the challenge of forging itself a new role outside the EU. Brexit disrupted many of the existing relationships and avenues through which the UK was previously able to exert influence on the international stage. In the coming months and years, the UK will need to deal with the practical challenges created by Brexit, in addition to designing an integrated framework for foreign policy, security, defence and development.

The vision put forward by the current UK government for the post-Brexit UK is that of a ‘Global Britain’: an open, outward-looking and confident champion for the rules-based international order, leading by example as a force for good in the world. As a key part of the process of ‘reinventing’ itself, the UK seeks to build on its positive track record on climate to enhance its position as a global leader on action on climate change.

To achieve this goal, and to present itself as a coherent and trustworthy international actor on climate, the UK needs to corroborate its world-leading domestic climate targets with credible plans, policies and strategies that are able to deliver on them. However, recent analysis by The Prince of Wales’s Corporate Leaders Group indicates that more action is still needed to put the UK on track to meet its climate targets, underscoring just how important it is for the government’s Net Zero Strategy, due to be published in autumn 2021 ahead of COP26, to map out a credible, comprehensive and realistic pathway to net zero.

For the UK to maintain and build on its reputation as a global leader on climate, it must put climate at the centre of its policies, and back bold statements and ambitious agendas with action. This briefing outlines some of the ways in which Brexit could make this task easier or more challenging.

1. Climate ambition

To date, the UK has performed better on climate than any other major economy. Its domestic track record on decoupling emissions from economic growth sets the UK in a strong position to be acknowledged as a global leader in action against climate change. Over the past three decades, the UK reduced its emissions by over 45 per cent between 1990 and 2018, while its economy grew by 75 per cent. Although this was
achieved partially through changes in the structure of the UK’s industry, large emissions reductions also emerged as a result of substantial improvements in material efficiency, reduced energy intensity of production processes, and more widespread use of less polluting fuels – including a shift away from coal in the power sector.

The UK is also committed to ambitious emissions reductions in the future. In 2008, it was the first country globally to set a legally binding climate change mitigation target as part of the Climate Change Act. In 2019, this initial target of 80 per cent greenhouse gas emissions reduction by 2050 was revised upwards, making the UK the first major economy to set a legally binding net zero greenhouse gas emissions target.

During the Brexit transition period in December 2020, the UK government set the UK’s first independent nationally determined contribution (NDC), promising “a cut of at least 68 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030”. This target puts the UK on track for its net zero goal, and shows a high level of ambition, as well as signalling the UK’s intention to act more urgently on climate than any other major economy.

Other recent progressive announcements in 2020 included a promise to direct a considerable proportion of the UK’s Covid-19 recovery spending to ‘green’ measures and a new Ten Point Plan for a “green industrial revolution”. Further details on the government’s plans for the energy sector were laid out in the Energy White Paper.

Had the UK remained in the EU, it would not have been able to formally submit its own NDC, although EU membership would have technically not prevented it from having a more ambitious target than that agreed to by all Member States. However, leaving the EU makes it possible for the UK to implement some of the regulatory changes that are likely needed to achieve such ambitious emissions reductions by 2030.

2. Regulation

In principle, a post-Brexit UK will be free to design its own environmental and emissions reduction regulations and provide incentives for the private sector to reduce their emissions. In practice, however, the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which was ratified by the EU Member States just days prior to the UK’s departure from the block in late December 2020, contains a range of requirements that constrain this freedom.

The EU–UK trade agreement provides only a basic framework for the future trade relationship, but the so-called ‘level playing field’ conditions contained in it are stricter than in other recent trade agreements signed by the EU. These conditions set common rules and standards that prevent businesses in either market gaining a competitive advantage over each other, including a non-regression principle, stipulating that neither side should weaken their existing environmental or climate protection, and rules on ‘unfair’ regulatory restrictions.

The trade deal also obliges the UK to follow the EU rules for state aid (subsidies for business) and competition if it wishes to enjoy tariff-free access to the European markets. However, it does also not provide certainty over potential future changes: while the UK has (in principle) retained the right to break away from EU rules in the future, it will likely see its access to the European market limited if any changes are deemed to be unfair to EU businesses. As such, the trade deal does not guarantee UK businesses tariff-free access to European markets in the longer term.
From a climate perspective, the trade deal does not have many substantial impacts beyond the rules stipulating that the UK cannot weaken existing protections, either by rolling them back or failing to enforce them, a condition that the UK was prepared to meet. Ahead of the December 2020 trade deal, the UK had already adopted over 120 pieces of environmental legislation to replace EU environmental regulations, submitted its own NDC, and announced plans to replace the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with its own standalone ETS. The extent to which requirements in the EU–UK trade deal will prevent the UK from implementing domestic policies on climate and environment independently of the EU is currently difficult to estimate in detail, but preliminary analysis would suggest that some opportunities for translating greater ambition into practice through regulation are likely to emerge.

**Domestic transport**

One major impact of Brexit is that, outside the EU single market and customs union, the UK can exercise greater control over its domestic markets. The intention to end the sale of new petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2030 and hybrid cars and vans by 2035 (one of the targets listed in the Prime Minister’s Ten Point Plan for a “green industrial revolution”) would not have been possible to enforce under the EU single market. Although some EU countries, such as France, have already announced such bans – and some others, such as Denmark, have called for national bans by individual Member States to be allowed – national sales bans are not compatible with the current EU legal framework, and would be difficult to justify as it would distort the EU single market and be potentially open to abuse (a car bought in one country for use in another).

The UK’s progressive decision to bring forward the date for banning petrol and diesel vehicles may well prompt action at international level, both in the EU and beyond. For example, it may put pressure on the EU to amend its current laws to make this type of progressive action legally acceptable in individual Member States, and provoke positive competition between the UK and other countries.

Outside the EU single market, the UK is now also free to follow the Climate Change Committee’s recent recommendations for the Sixth Carbon Budget (2033–37) to end diesel heavy goods vehicle (HGV) sales by 2040, ban the sale of domestic oil boilers by 2028 and gas boilers by 2033, and to ban the use of fossil-fuelled cars, vans and boilers altogether by 2050. However, the UK government has not yet indicated whether it intends to follow these recommendations or not. Moreover, it is unclear how any bans enacted by the UK government could be enforced in Gibraltar or Northern Ireland, while any negative impact of Brexit on the UK automotive industry could make progressive regulation on petrol and diesel vehicles harder to deliver in practice.

**Agriculture and land use**

Another substantial impact of Brexit is that the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has stopped applying to the UK, which is now able to design and implement its own policies on land use and agriculture. These policies can provide greater support for farmers and landowners to incentivise and reward sustainable farming and land management practices. For example, England’s new Environment Bill is set to create new, legally binding, environmental improvement targets that are more ambitious than currently applicable laws in the EU, while the Agriculture and Fisheries Acts give ministers and devolved administrations the power to create more sustainable farming and fishing sectors.

The Agriculture Act, which passed into law in November 2020, includes a new plan for sustainable farming and a new Environmental Land Management system, which will pay farmers to improve ‘public goods’ like better air and water quality, improve soil and enable thriving wildlife. Under this bill, Productivity Grants...
will be made available for farmers to invest in modern technology to make their businesses more efficient and more profitable, while reducing their emissions.\textsuperscript{15}

These new mechanisms offer new sources of income to the UK farmers who used to receive a substantial proportion of their income from annual payments under the CAP. However, critics of Brexit fear that the removal of CAP payments may expose many farmers to extreme pressures, while changes to trade as a result of leaving the single market and the customs union are already disrupting habitual trading patterns.\textsuperscript{19}

Although the UK government is committed to maintaining overall funding levels to the agricultural sector at present, this may change as public spending pressures grow, potentially resulting in substantial (negative) changes to farmers’ incomes.\textsuperscript{19} The changes are disproportionately expected to affect beef and sheep farmers, who are heavily reliant on direct payments, and may lose up to 60–80 per cent of their income following the reduction in CAP direct support, while demand for their products in Europe may decline considerably as a result of the complications and delays caused by non-tariff barriers.\textsuperscript{19,25}

The fact that agriculture, forestry, fisheries and environment are all devolved policy areas with different approaches in different parts of the UK may end up further complicating matters for businesses and landowners who operate in multiple locations. On the other hand, Scotland and Wales are now in the position to draft their own afforestation and environmental protection plans, agricultural subsidy policies and other regulations, enabling these policies and plans to be geared specifically to their local conditions.

\textit{Energy policy}

In terms of energy policy, departure from the EU could also have implications for the UK’s approach to the use of biomass. After Brexit, the UK no longer contributes to certain EU subsidy schemes, such as the biofuel incentives offered under the EU Renewable Energy Directive, which have been criticised for contributing to deforestation, damaging the health of European forests, threatening biodiversity and undermining climate goals.\textsuperscript{26}

However, it is not yet clear whether the UK government plans to cut its biomass imports now that the financial incentive to burning them has been removed, or whether it plans to maintain national subsidies to it (pre-Brexit, the UK was one of the biggest subsidisers of bioenergy in the EU). The reference to biomass in the \textit{Energy White Paper}\textsuperscript{16} as “one of our most valuable tools for reaching net zero emissions” indicates the absence of any immediate plans to cut the use of biomass, but does not specifically mention biomass imports. More detail on the UK’s future biomass plans are to be expected in the new Biomass Strategy, due in 2022, which will also assess the UK’s current biomass sustainability standards.\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{Emissions trading}

Brexit has removed the UK from the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), enabling it to set up its own system to control emissions from energy-intensive industries. In December 2020, the UK government announced its plans to implement a standalone Emissions Trading System (UK ETS) from 1 January 2021 to replace the current EU ETS, promising that the new system would be tighter than its EU counterpart and thus capable of delivering greater emissions reductions.\textsuperscript{16} Whether the UK will be able to deliver on this promise, however, depends on various factors, including the industry’s willingness to accept higher carbon prices at a time when import and export-related costs are increasing as a result of Brexit. There is a possibility that any attempt to increase the carbon price too much above the EU level risks provoking a
political backlash – particularly from industries that fear the policies will damage the competitiveness of British companies and lead to carbon leakage.\textsuperscript{19,27}

The decision to adopt an Emissions Trading System rather than a \textit{carbon tax} was welcomed by a number of key businesses, which had been campaigning for a cap-and-trade system on the grounds that it would provide a more “efficient, cost-effective, and transparent mechanism for achieving the UK’s climate goals” than a carbon tax.\textsuperscript{26} Opting for an ETS enables the UK to simplify its carbon pricing policy and make it more responsive to unexpected changes in production levels,\textsuperscript{28} while also leaving open the possibility to link the UK system with the larger European one at some point in the future, as has been done by Switzerland, or internationally with non-European partners.\textsuperscript{29,30}

The greater \textit{market liquidity} that could be achieved by linking the UK ETS with other emissions trading systems would reduce the risk of volatility owing to the limited size of the market in a standalone UK ETS,\textsuperscript{31} but could potentially undermine any gains from increased domestic ambition. However, the UK’s national policies that preceded Brexit, such as the UK carbon price floor and the Climate Change Levy, which were designed to stabilise volatile carbon market prices and to provide carbon price certainty for businesses, would most likely continue to operate alongside the UK ETS even if it was linked with the EU ETS.

Departure from the EU would also enable the UK to set up its own \textit{Border Carbon Adjustment} (BCA) mechanism to protect heavy industry as it decarbonises, but developing a system that is compliant with the UK’s legal obligations and acceptable to other World Trade Organization member countries might prove difficult in practice. Moreover, a domestic BCA could increase costs for importers and consumers and damage the UK’s international relationships,\textsuperscript{27} meaning that co-operating with the EU on this issue instead of seeking to set up its own system might prove to be more pragmatic.\textsuperscript{31}

3. Economic leverage

Large markets can drive change within as well as beyond their boundaries by requiring domestically produced goods and imports to meet certain criteria. The larger and more lucrative the market, the more willing foreign companies are to ensure that their products meet the conditions to be granted entry.

Regulations that make entry to a given market conditional on certain \textit{standards}, such as energy efficiency or carbon intensity, can provide powerful incentives for companies across the world to adopt more sustainable practices. When stipulations on environmental impact or emissions reduction commitment are included in \textit{trade agreements}, a large enough market can persuade entire countries to commit to more ambitious targets or policies.\textsuperscript{32}

The EU is the top trading partner for 80 countries, nearly four times as many as the US.\textsuperscript{33} While it was still an EU Member State, the UK was able to influence the discussions and decisions on conditions governing the access of products, materials and services to (what was then) the world’s largest single market. Under the Green Deal, and driven by its recent net zero target, the EU is likely to implement increasingly strict policies on climate and environment, including more stringent product standards to create new markets for environmentally friendly goods. Environmental climate-related provisions are also likely to play a growing role in the block’s trade policy,\textsuperscript{32} potentially raising the block’s profile internationally as a market that requires trading partners to be committed to sufficiently ambitious action on sustainability.
Brexit opens the door for the UK to strike new trade deals beyond the EU, enabling it to capitalise more fully on trade with other major economies such as Japan, India and the US. Although the UK’s economic leverage is substantially lower than that of the EU, it is still a sizeable market with over 60 million consumers, relatively high living standards and the world’s sixth largest national economy, which makes it a lucrative trading partner for many countries. To maintain its reputation as the global leader on climate, the UK will need to apply similarly high sustainability standards when negotiating trade deals. However, it may need to exercise a certain degree of patience when it comes to trade negotiations with large economies, such as the US, which may prioritise striking deals with the bigger EU market first, leaving the UK waiting for its turn.

When making decisions regarding domestic policies, such as more stringent carbon content or energy efficiency standards, the UK will also need to consider its potential impacts on its domestic businesses and consumers. UK businesses, consumers and the economy all rely heavily on trade, especially with the EU. In 2019, international trade accounted for around 30 per cent of the UK’s GDP, with the EU being by far the most important trading partner: over 40 per cent of exports go to the EU, while more than half of the UK’s imports come from the EU. In 2019, the UK exports to the EU were worth over £170 billion. Any regulatory barriers that might negatively affect the flow of goods across the English Channel would therefore be, even if legally allowed, pragmatically difficult, and potentially damaging to the UK economy and the competitiveness of UK-based businesses. While more stringent regulations on climate and environment might gain traction among more progressive businesses, there is a risk that businesses that do not wish to comply would simply relocate outside of the UK, taking jobs with them. This could lead to carbon leakage, with a negative impact on global emissions, as well as unfavourable economic and employment outcomes for the UK.

4. Research and innovation

The UK has a strong reputation on research and innovation, as highlighted by the recent success of the Oxford/AstraZeneca Covid-19 vaccine. As the home of some of the best universities and research hubs in the world, the UK has, for a long time, punched above its weight in science, innovation and technology.

The UK is an effective low carbon innovator in areas such as electric motors, electricity distribution and domestic appliances, and home to internationally renowned expertise in services such as climate risk assessments, legal and consulting on regulations, and resource efficiency software. Researchers and professors from UK institutions are among the leading authors of many of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s most influential reports, making an important contribution to international climate science consensus.

The expertise of scientists and progressive thinkers has also been used to inform domestic policy on climate and energy, delivering practical payoffs. For example, a proactive approach to renewable energy, combining incentives with risk mitigation mechanisms, enabled the UK to develop a rapidly growing offshore wind industry in less than a decade. The Climate Change Committee, an independent non-departmental public body, draws on world-class expertise on science and policy in its advice to the central and devolved governments and parliaments on tackling climate change.

The longer-term impacts of Brexit on opportunities to foster pan-European collaboration and the future of research and innovation in the UK are difficult to estimate at the moment. While the access to some
European research funds has been withdrawn, other funding sources remain available, although in amended terms of participation. As of 1 January 2021, UK-based entrepreneurs, innovators and companies are no longer eligible for funding from the European Innovation Council Accelerator (a new equity fund for technology start-ups that is administered by Horizon Europe),\(^{40}\) the European Innovation Council (EIC) equity funding, or the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) other innovation funding instruments for businesses.\(^{41}\) On the other hand, two European nuclear research programmes and the forthcoming Horizon Europe flagship research programme remain available to the UK, in exchange for a contribution to the EU budget.\(^{40}\)

The Horizon Europe research programme is of particular importance to sustainability and climate research, as the fund will allocate at least 30 per cent of its €85 billion budget over the next seven years to research on climate change mitigation, with an additional 7.5 per cent being earmarked for biodiversity objectives from 2024, and 10 per cent from 2026 onwards.\(^{42}\) However, the UK will retain access to Horizon Europe only as an ‘associate’ member, meaning that it will have no influence over the programme’s priorities or how the money is spent in the future.\(^{40,41}\) An ‘associate’ membership in Horizon Europe is also less secure than that of a Member State, with the EU retaining the right to unilaterally cancel the arrangement if it believes that the UK has reneged on any particular part of it. This is not an empty threat: in 2014, the Swiss were barred from Horizon 2020 for three years after a national referendum rejected a Swiss–EU agreement allowing Croatian access to the Swiss labour market.\(^{40}\)

On the other hand, UK-based researchers already collaborate with partners all over the world, and Brexit may open up even more opportunities and funding streams for international collaboration with non-European countries, such as the US, China, India and Australia – although any specific plans are yet to be announced. So far, the discussion on the potential impacts of Brexit on universities have focused on issues affecting students, such as a new immigration regime for students, and preliminary plans to replace the EU-wide Erasmus scheme with a new, more international programme, named after the mathematician Alan Turing.\(^{43}\)

Following Brexit, there is a possibility that the UK government may be able to circumvent some of the stringent EU regulations on research and development (R&D) relief to subsidise and support the development of new low carbon technologies in the private sector, although the extent to which this is possible under the trade deal conditions on level playing field is not clear. Before the December trade deal was agreed, the UK government implied that its spending on science would “grow quickly and become more adventurous” post-Brexit, with a promise of a new state-backed agency to promote ambitious “high-risk, high-reward” experiments.\(^{44}\) However, to ensure that the benefits from this additional funding will materialise, the UK may need to develop new routes for talent recruitment from overseas to ensure that restrictive immigration policy will not make it more difficult for universities and companies’ R&D departments to recruit talented staff if the number of appropriately skilled EU migrants declines.

5. Political influence

The UK has undeniable international weight and political clout. It is a nuclear power, one of the founders of NATO, and the world’s sixth largest national economy. It holds a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and has an abundance of soft power from its diplomatic and cultural history, the Commonwealth, through its spending on foreign aid and international programmes and alliances such as Gavi, the English
language, and the BBC – one of the most highly respected broadcasting companies in the world.\textsuperscript{1} It is also not afraid to make bold moves when necessary, such as when human rights have been violated, as evidenced by the speedy development of a new route to British citizenship for up to three million Hong Kongers in 2020.\textsuperscript{45}

Departure from the EU allows the UK more flexibility, time and resources to develop new alliances and to strengthen existing ones, beyond the EU’s borders. Post-Brexit, these friendships and alliances will become increasingly important for the UK.\textsuperscript{36} For example, the UK has already opened discussions on joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade area of 11 countries, and will potentially also explore the possibility to become a “dialogue partner” of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.\textsuperscript{35}

To capitalise on the opportunities, and to be truly seen as the ‘Global Britain’ it wishes to be, the UK must present itself as a credible, reliable and desirable ally at the international stage – something that the recent developments in the UK may undermine. Over the past few years, the UK has seen its international credibility challenged by the tensions and uncertainties around Brexit, and the negative impact these have had on productivity and investment by businesses\textsuperscript{46} and trust in government.\textsuperscript{47} Renewed calls for Scottish independence and a united Ireland,\textsuperscript{1} the Prime Minister proposing actions that would have risked breaking international law,\textsuperscript{48} a last-minute trade deal with the EU that resulted in two internal borders within the UK,\textsuperscript{49} and poor handling of the Covid-19 crises,\textsuperscript{50} have all diminished the UK’s image abroad. Internal squabbles within the governing party and controversial decisions, such as cutting the UK’s development aid budget below promised levels, have further eroded the UK’s moral leadership on the world stage.\textsuperscript{51} As The Economist writes, “Britain will not be taken seriously abroad if it is falling apart at home”.\textsuperscript{1}

In 2021, presidency of the G7 summit and hosting COP26 will provide the UK with opportunities to show international leadership and present itself in a positive light, moving beyond the recent challenges that have dented its reputation in the international arena. For example, by inviting Australia, India and South Korea to join the G7 summit, the UK will be able to demonstrate to the world the benefits of a friendly relationship with the UK.

The presidency of COP26 in November 2021 will also provide the UK with a golden opportunity to demonstrate its position as a global leader. The UK has strong climate credentials and intends to use the COP26 summit to showcase its post-Brexit plans, while urging others to follow suit.\textsuperscript{19} In this context, the upcoming decisions and plans, such as the UK’s promised Net Zero Strategy, hold great international significance. Recent announcements, including the UK’s commitment to protecting 30 per cent of its land and ocean by the end of the decade, indicate that it is serious not just about climate, but also environmental protection. A promise to spend at least £3 billion to protect nature and biodiversity, and to support sustainable food production in developing countries over the next five years, gives further gravitas to its domestic plans.\textsuperscript{52}

However, for the UK to attain credibility at the international stage as a global leader on climate, it needs to back up its pledges and promises with concrete commitment and action. At present, the UK falls short of the ideal in this regard: according to the Climate Change Committee\textsuperscript{53} and other commentators,\textsuperscript{6,54,55} the current policies do not deliver sufficient emissions reductions to put the UK on track to meet its 2030 or 2050 emissions reduction targets. Moreover, the UK has been unable to replicate the policy-driven success of decarbonisation in the power sector in other key sectors, such as buildings and transport.\textsuperscript{19} Controversial decisions, such as not challenging the planning application for a new coal mine\textsuperscript{56} despite being one of the founding members of the Powering Past Coal Alliance,\textsuperscript{57} and permitting the use of
pesticides banned in the EU that could impact biodiversity, do not only cause domestic concern but also attract international attention, giving rise to questions over the UK’s ability and willingness to lead by example.

For the UK to present a credible voice as a leader on climate at COP26 – and to fulfil its vision of a ‘Global Britain’ – it needs to get its house in order. Publishing a strong and credible long-term strategy ahead of COP26 to set out how the UK will put itself on track to meet its 2030 and 2050 targets will set a strong lead that other countries can follow. Making the G7 and COP26 a success could also help the UK to reassert itself as a strong and credible leader on climate, while the recent success of the UK’s Covid-19 vaccination programme is already demonstrating its ability to tackle difficult challenges with decisive action.

Next steps

Following Brexit, the UK has lost access to shared resources, as well as direct influence on EU international diplomacy and climate ambition, and the power to influence product standards in the world’s largest single market.

However, it has regained greater control over its domestic markets and is now able to push through legislative measures to support ambitious emissions reduction targets more easily. For example, enforcing a national ban on petrol and diesel vehicles ahead of other EU countries would not have been possible had the UK remained in the EU. It also has greater flexibility to pursue new innovations and diplomatic approaches.

To deliver on the post-Brexit vision of ‘Global Britain’ as set out by the Prime Minister and the wider UK government, the UK needs a clear strategy for how it will leverage its strengths and manage the new challenges.

With specific regard to climate leadership this could include:

• Well before COP26, setting out a comprehensive Net Zero Strategy and policy framework to deliver on the UK’s climate targets that is credible domestically and internationally, so it can build on its reputation for climate leadership and support the UK’s international diplomacy to catalyse increased action by other countries.
• Identifying where there are benefits with close collaboration and linkage to the EU, as the closest large market, and actively pursuing those links – for example connecting emissions trading systems.
• Identifying where the UK can move more flexibly and nimbly than the EU, using its freedom to regulate and deregulate, to support innovation and to set its own priorities to pilot new approaches that can unlock economic transition and more sustainable approaches more quickly and effectively.
• Using 2021 and the opportunities provided by the G7 and COP26 to reintroduce the UK to the world as a post-Brexit actor – demonstrating it can be an internationally minded, credible, reliable and strong global partner.
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