Finance, climate action plans and carbon markets: What to expect from COP29
Introduction
Global co-operation to address climate change is organised under the remit of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or UNFCCC – one of a small number of global treaties agreed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Every year the Conference of the Parties (COP)[1] – ie a meeting of the nearly 200 countries that are signed up to the UNFCCC, as well as a range of civil society observers – is held to advance the UNFCCC’s goal to limit the impact of climate change. Led by the host country, generally each COP reaches a consensus on a statement or a binding agreement which is publicly released at the end of the conference. Recent years have seen some significant developments emerge, particularly since the Paris Agreement was negotiated and signed by 196 countries at COP21 in 2016.[2]
While other global fora like the G7, G20 and the UN General Assembly might see some agreements being struck on particular areas of climate-relevant collaboration, the UNFCCC talks have the legitimacy and scale to bring together global efforts on climate change. Also, because they allow a voice and a veto to all parties including vulnerable countries, they have seen a number of breakthrough moments where the global ambition for addressing climate change has increased. That said, progress at these international talks can only proceed at a rate that is able to be backed by domestic support and action from all the countries within the talks.
At COP28 in Dubai in 2023, the Parties agreed the UAE Consensus.[3] This key achievement saw 198 countries agreeing to a landmark deal to start “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, the first time fossil fuels were expressly mentioned in a UNFCCC COP decision. Additionally, countries agreed to fund and operationalise the landmark ‘Loss and Damage Fund’,[4] designed to support countries dealing with unavoidable climate damage and originally agreed at COP27 in Egypt. And in response to the first Global Stocktake (GST),[5] a process for assessing countries’ progress against their commitments under the Paris Agreement, countries made a range of commitments including agreeing to triple renewables and double energy efficiency by 2030 and planning to halt deforestation by 2030.
The 29th COP (COP29) is set to be hosted by Azerbaijan in November 2024, and the Azerbaijani Presidency[6] has a lot on its agenda. The key areas being negotiated are the:
- New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance:[7] agreeing a new commitment to provide annual climate finance to developing countries, replacing a previous goal of $100 billion per annum set in 2009 and met in 2023.
- Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs):[8] encouraging countries to commit to more ambitious and extensive 2035 climate change targets and plans, due to be submitted by February 2025.
- Adaptation: developing more specifics on how countries will deliver on the Global Goal on Adaptation[9] – ie putting in place measures to cope with and minimise the unavoidable impacts of climate change.
- Article 6: pushing forward thorny discussions around Article 6,[10] which covers climate action co-operation both between countries and with and between non-state actors like business. This includes discussions on potential carbon market structure.
In an increasingly turbulent geopolitical context, reaching consensus will be more challenging than ever. This is exacerbated by the continued growth in populist and nationalist politics. There is also concern that the outcome of the United States (US) election just one week before COP29 kicks off could be a decisive factor for COP29 outcomes and have implications for the international climate regime more broadly[11] and the future of US climate finance funding.[12] US Presidential candidate Donald Trump previously withdrew the US from the Paris Agreement in 2020 when he was then President, and if he is re-elected in November, he is said to want to exit the Paris Agreement again and prevent the US from re-entry.[13]
In this context of growing political debate internationally alongside ever-rising temperatures, this year’s COP will be more important than ever for bridging these divides and getting the world back on track for 1.5°C. The UNFCCC COP is central to tackling climate change as the only forum which brings together all countries in the world to discuss and collaborate on climate action.
The private sector is key to the implementation of the outcomes, both on a global and a national level. Businesses can take on the mantle through corporate climate commitments and investments and by advocating a stronger policy and regulatory environment from governments to enable a just transition. This includes taking action to phase out fossil fuels across their operations and actively advocating more progressive policies, sending a strong demand signal to their value chain to phase out fossil fuels and scale clean solutions faster.[14] The finance sector also has a key role to play in ensuring private finance is helping deliver collective climate goals.
This briefing sets out what to expect from the negotiations, the topics which will be most important, the elements needed for a successful outcome, and how the private sector can help to push the international climate agenda forward. These insights will be invaluable for businesses planning to engage with COP29, as well as policymakers and those in the environmental space seeking to understand the dynamics at play this year.
COP29 Context
Hosting COP29 presents both a challenge and an opportunity to Azerbaijan. While the Presidency’s priorities do not strictly determine the outcomes at a COP, the Presidency can be highly influential in shaping the agenda, directing focus towards particular topics and rallying momentum around ambitious goals. As such, what they do and say could be critical to the final outcomes and will be carefully scrutinised in the lead up to and at COP29.
While they will want to build on the consensus and progress at COP28, their history and position as a petrostate is likely to attract criticism and raise questions of how strong and influential they are likely to be in negotiating an ambitious outcome. Azerbaijan has emerged as a major player in the eastern Caucasian region, increasing its economic standing through deals with major international energy companies. However there remain ongoing concerns about human rights, democratic processes and corruption which must not be overlooked, especially as the government seeks to use the COP as an opportunity to grow its international reach and business connectivity.
Building on COP28
The Azerbaijani Presidency will seek to build on the achievements of COP28 where the major negotiated outcome was the UAE Consensus. This included the political response to the first Global Stocktake (GST), the process which aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of the world’s progress on climate action and an opportunity to ratchet up ambition. The reports produced through the GST process in 2023 found that the world is significantly off track to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, and that accelerated action by countries was, and still is, urgently needed to combat the growing threats posed by climate change.[15] Taking this on board, the UAE Consensus recognised the need for rapid and sustained emissions reductions.
The UAE Consensus also called on countries to transition away from fossil fuels.[16] This marked the first time that fossil fuel reduction has been explicitly mentioned in a UNFCCC COP decision, although it was compromise language, as more than 100 countries had called for the agreement to ‘phase out’ oil, gas and coal use. Other notable outcomes from COP28 included setting a new target for tripling renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030, encouraging countries to submit economy-wide NDCs, operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund to secure financial help for the countries most affected by climate change, and the delivery of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience to advance adaptation efforts.
As the decision for Azerbaijan to host COP29 was only agreed during the COP28 summit, the UAE also looked ahead to COP30 in 2025, which was already agreed to be hosted by Brazil and by which time countries will need to have submitted updated NDCs. The UAE Presidency committed to working closely with both the COP29’s Azerbaijani Presidency and COP30’s Brazilian Presidency through a ‘Presidencies Troika’, the aim of which is to maintain momentum in support of limiting temperature rise to1.5°C.[17] This troika could also support Azerbaijan in achieving greater outcomes from COP29. Working with Brazil closely will be key, as in addition to hosting COP30 in late 2025, Brazil is also set to host the G20, where climate change and sustainable development will be on the agenda. The timing of the G20 coincides with COP29, taking place during the second week of it, meaning there is an opportunity, if taken, for the outcomes from one to be mutually reinforcing and amplifying of the other.
Azerbaijan’s Presidency as a petrostate
As with the UAE’s Presidency,[18] COP29 has also attracted criticism for being hosted by a petrostate[19] with concerns over what this means for the final negotiated outcomes. Azerbaijan’s economy is anchored in oil and gas production, which accounted for roughly 47.8 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and over 92.5 per cent of export revenue in 2022.[20] Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, has stated that Azerbaijan will continue to invest in its ‘god given’ gas, matching findings by the anti-corruption non-governmental organisation (NGO) Global Witness that the country plans to expand its natural gas production by a third in the next decade.[21],[22]
The choice of Mukhtar Babayev, currently Azerbaijan’s ecology and natural resources minister, as COP29 President has also been critiqued due to his background working for the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) for 26 years.[23] However, Babayev has insisted that it is the “intention of Azerbaijan to turn the corner on our economy to green directions”.[24]
What is critical though is how they act in their role as host of COP29. Azerbaijan’s oil and gas ties could have implications for the climate negotiations in one of two ways. Either Azerbaijan will demonstrate weak leadership on the transition away from fossil fuels, or it will act as a more effective middle man, thereby “building bridges between the diverging north and south to keep 1.5°C in reach” as Babayev has promised.[25]
So far, the COP29 President has asserted Azerbaijan’s commitment to deliver positive outcomes. In a speech setting out his Presidency’s priorities, Babayev recognised climate finance as one of the most challenging topics for climate diplomacy, particularly how to finance climate action in developing countries. He asserted Azerbaijan’s commitment to support parties to deliver updated NDCs and new National Adaptation Plans (NAPs)[26] at COP29.[27] Babayev also singled out finalising the fraught negotiations on carbon markets and operationalising the Loss and Damage Fund as priorities. Lastly, he called on the private sector to remain committed to decarbonisation and to engage with COP29, particularly in discussions around climate finance, signalling a clear role for business.
Alongside Babayev, Azerbaijan has appointed Azerbaijani politician, Nigar Arpadarai, as the COP29 High-Level Champion.[28] Arpadarai has pledged to focus on the private sector, stating that all non-state actors have a role to play in driving climate action and that business forums will be held at COP29 to ensure private sector proposals are heard.[29],[30] She reiterated her commitment to enhancing the role of the private sector, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and to fair representation of all businesses, at the Bonn Climate Change Conference in June.
How the High-Level Champion engages other non-state actors, such as civil society, is also likely to be carefully scrutinised. NGOs can be accredited to observe the negotiations and have a role in holding countries to account, as well as advocating policy changes, raising awareness and implementing sustainable projects. Alongside concerns about oil and gas ties, there are also concerns on how Azerbaijan will treat civil society and media, with reports that in advance of COP29 crackdowns are happening within the country.[31]
Key issues to address at COP29
Several topics have emerged as the top priorities for COP29, namely:
- Agreeing a robust new climate finance goal which responds to the needs of developing countries.
- Pushing for updated NDCs which are ambitious, credible, and deliverable.
- Setting out the specifics of the global goal on adaptation.
- Ironing out Article 6 on carbon markets.
These key issues are set out in more detail below.
Agreeing a new finance goal
"Our task is to invite as much as possible the private sector for climate finance – it’s a very good source for new initiatives, new formats, [and] new mechanisms for finance”
Mukhtar Babayev, COP29 President
What is the state of play on climate finance?
Climate finance is a critical enabler of climate action and is set to be the major theme at COP29. This is because a post-2025 finance goal, known as the ‘new collective quantified goal’ (NCQG), is due to be agreed. Countries signed up to the Paris Agreement decided that the goal should be set “from a floor of $100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”.[32] The $100 billion figure relates to a pledge agreed in 2009 which was due to be mobilised by 2020, but has only recently been met and is seen by many as too little too late.[33]
This history of under-delivery makes the Azerbaijani Presidency’s task to build trust between developed and developing countries and secure an NCQG which is higher in both quantity and quality that much harder. Despite these challenges, new analysis from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides some source of encouragement as they find a total of $115.9 billion was mobilised by developed countries in 2022, marking a significant increase in financing of $26.3 billion or 30 per cent compared to 2021.[34]
Discussions have been centred around the mobilisation of funds to support developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable, to accelerate climate action. The consortium of thought leaders ‘Allied for Climate Transformation by 2025’ (ACT2025), which aims to elevate the voices of climate-vulnerable countries in UN climate negotiations, has developed a COP29 Call to Action which emphasises that finance is lacking across the board, and that a successful outcome in 2025 and beyond hinges on the finance decisions made at COP29.[35] The NCQG has the potential to be a dealbreaker for securing more ambitious NDCs by early 2025, as well as delivering on all previous commitments to scale up ambition. However, countries remain at odds over the most fundamental aspects of the goal including how large it should be, what it should cover and over how many years, transparency mechanisms, and of course the elephant in the room – who should pay.[36] The following sets out the key elements which will need to be addressed in NCQG negotiations at COP29 to achieve a robust post-2025 finance goal.
What should the NCQG cover, and what would a successful outcome for climate finance look like at COP29?
Quantity
Determining the total value needed, and indeed what can feasibly be delivered under the NCQG, is challenging, with consensus only that it should be above $100 billion annually. In terms of total need, most figures indicate the value would need to be in the trillions rather than billions, with costed needs in developing countries estimated at $5.8–5.9 trillion for NDCs for the pre-2030 period by the UNFCCC.[37] The Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance (IHLEG) has reported that emerging markets and developing countries (not including China) will need to spend around $1 trillion per year by 2025, and around $2.4 trillion per year by 2030, to transform the energy system, respond to growing vulnerability to climate change, and invest in restoring nature.[38] This is within the broader context of global climate finance needing to increase at least five-fold annually, up to an estimated $9 trillion a year by 2030.[39]
Overall, it is unlikely that such high figures can be agreed upon and mobilised. This was illustrated by the informal input paper which has just come out of the NCQG negotiations at the Bonn Climate Change Conference, where developing countries put forward figures like $1.1 trillion per year and $1.3 trillion per year, but developed countries have only acknowledged that it should be higher than the previous $100 billion goal.[40] Indeed, some are wary of agreeing on any quantum figure at all as this could risk anchoring the number at too low a level.
Thematic scope
Whether subcategory targets should be included is also up for debate, particularly around mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Subgoals under the NCQG for mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage may help to ensure a more even spread of financing for the most vulnerable countries which are already feeling acute impacts of climate change. Mitigation financing currently accounts for the majority of climate finance flows internationally and will continue to be critical in the transition away from fossil fuels. However, there is a strong need to significantly increase adaptation finance to protect the most vulnerable from the impacts of climate change. In 2021–22, only 5 per cent of total climate finance flowed to adaptation finance.[41]
The NCQG will need to reaffirm commitments to double adaptation finance by 2025. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) projects the adaptation financing needs of developing countries to be $130–415 billion annually until 2030, rising to $1.1–1.7 trillion in 2050.[42] In addition to the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP28, there is also a strong push from vulnerable countries to include loss and damage as a focus area within the NCQG.[43] Total loss and damage needs have been projected to reach as much as $580 billion annually by 2030 and $1.7 trillion annually by 2050.[44]
Timeframe
Negotiators will need to decide whether the NCQG should be a short-, medium-, or long-term goal; there are benefits and drawbacks for each. Proposals from countries have ranged from five to ten and even twenty-five years. The benefit of a shorter-term five-year goal is that it would align well with existing UNFCCC processes like the renewal of the NDCs and the GST, could increase the likelihood of delivery given the urgency, and would provide flexibility to update the goal based on emerging needs.
However, there may be limited political appetite to reopen climate finance negotiations so often. By contrast, a longer-term goal would more closely relate to net zero mid-century targets and may be able to deliver a more ambitious commitment, but could risk the proverbial can being kicked down the road. Developing countries have expressed a preference for a shorter-term timeframe, whereas developed countries including Switzerland and the EU prefer a medium- to longer-term target.[45] A potential compromise is to agree a longer-term goal, but with a review timeline built in every five to ten years.
Who should contribute and benefit?
The debate over which countries should contribute to the NCQG is likely to be a sticking point at COP29. Some developed countries have called for the base of contributors to be broadened beyond the traditional donor countries listed in Annex II of the UNFCCC, ie industrialised countries which were members of the OECD in 1992.[46],[47] They argue the landscape has changed since 1992 with some countries rapidly developing and becoming major emitters, meaning they could be asked to help bear the financial burden – other countries disagree and argue that industrialised countries that have historically contributed to climate and benefitted from resulting economic growth should continue to shoulder the burden. There are also arguments around where spending should be prioritised, as currently financing encompasses a diverse group from Least Developed Countries up to Middle Income Countries. It is likely that efforts will continue to be made by developed countries to direct money to the most vulnerable countries, but whether this is explicitly committed to in the final NCQG agreement remains to be seen.
Innovative finance sources and the role of the private sector
Opportunities to source finance more widely than traditional public financing and to incorporate innovative financing tools must be explored if the levels of climate finance needed are to be secured. It will not be possible to deliver the transition and raise the high levels of investment needed without private finance. However, there will still be debate on whether private finance is in or out of the NCQG target as some recipient countries are cautious of anything that weakens the pressure on donor countries to provide finance that has been long promised and late delivered.
The IHLEG report on climate finance highlights that a more purposeful approach with engagement from all key stakeholders including countries, the private sector, multilateral development banks, as well as donors and private philanthropy is needed.[48] Suggestions for innovation have included: deploying more finance from multilateral development banks (MDBs); thinking creatively about international taxation for certain industries such as shipping; the potential for a wealth tax which the Brazilian Presidency of the G20 has been pursuing; and there has also been discussion around debt relief and developing an expanded version of the ‘debt for climate’ swaps.
The IHLEG climate finance framework report hammers home the crucial role of the private sector in boosting both domestic and international private finance. It notes that international private finance to emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) for climate action will need to be increased more than 15 times to deliver on mitigation goals alone.[49] The report recommends that EMDC governments lead on co-creating investment programmes with the private sector and development finance institutions to strengthen project pipelines, and calls on MDBs to develop a more effective strategy to boost the low rates of private investment and finance, for example via de-risking and credit-enhancement tools. The International Energy Agency (IEA) also finds that smart use of public finance will need to come with much more private capital in energy investments in EMDCs.[50] The role of the private sector has also been recognised by the COP29 President, who said “our task is to invite as much as possible the private sector for climate finance – it’s a very good source for new initiatives, new formats, [and] new mechanisms for finance”.[51]
Instruments
The NCQG must seek to improve the quality of climate finance available, so it supports climate action in developing countries without exacerbating financial stress. For many developing countries with weaker institutions and economies it can be challenging to access finance, and the form the finance takes is also important with grants being preferred over loans that can worsen debt distress. Around 70 per cent of the finance mobilised under the current $100 billion goal has been linked to loans, hence the NCQG must be shaped in a way which avoids exacerbating the indebtedness of developing countries. This can be done by prioritising non-debt instruments and carefully considering the degree of concessionality, ie the ‘gift element’.[52] In this way, the NCQG can support broader sustainable development goals in developing countries.
Transparency and accountability
Lastly, strengthening transparency and accountability mechanisms will be crucial for the effective deployment of the NCQG. Clear methodologies for tracking and reporting climate finance in a timely way will need to be defined, aligned with the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement. Accurate information on how much finance is flowing, what types, and where will help to assess progress and build trust. This should also improve accountability on spending and ability to measure impact. Although countries have shown more consensus in relation to language on transparency than on most other NCQG issues, there are still many details to be ironed out at COP29. Ultimately, the negotiators must consider the economic context, public budget limitations, and the potential for innovative financing, including private sector involvement, to secure the necessary investment for a low-emissions, climate-resilient future for all.
Developing ambitious updated NDCs
“This next round of NDCs may be the most important documents to be produced in a multilateral context so far this century”
Simon Stiell, UNFCCC Executive Secretary
What are NDCs and why do they matter?
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) effectively operate as a country’s climate action plan, setting out targets for cutting emissions and adapting to climate impacts. All countries which are signatories to the Paris Agreement are required to develop new NDCs on a five-year cycle of increasingly ambitious climate action, known as the ‘ratchet mechanism’.[53] The next and third round of NDCs is due to be submitted by countries between November 2024 and February 2025, and will present updated targets for 2030 as well as new targets for 2035.
COP29 falls at the start of the submission window. This presents a major opportunity for non-state actors, including businesses, to advocate updated NDCs which raise ambition, put the world on an emissions trajectory in line with the 1.5°C warming limit, and build greater resilience to climate change. It is likely that the most committed countries, such as Azerbaijan and Brazil, will submit their NDCs in November at COP29. If these are ambitious, they could set an example and provide an advocacy opportunity to encourage other countries to demonstrate similarly high levels of commitment. As UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell hammered home in March, “This next round of NDCs may be the most important documents to be produced in a multilateral context so far this century”.[54]
By virtue of being nationally determined by each country’s governments, NDCs are intended to be flexible to the needs and unique contexts of each country. In theory this bottom-up approach means that countries can decide what is achievable and appropriate based on their individual circumstances, but it also means there are no stringent guidelines on what must be included in an NDC and therefore whether they are ambitious enough.
The following are areas commonly covered in NDCs:
- quantitative and qualitative targets to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change
- a timeline for these targets
- a set of actions across priority sectors such as energy, transport, agriculture, health, water, infrastructure and more as relevant to the country
- an estimated budget to achieve these climate goals (noting that many developing countries require external financial support and capacity building).[55]
What does an ambitious NDC look like?
Steep emissions reductions
There are several elements to an ambitious NDC. Firstly, it should set a stronger 2030 emissions-reduction target and a 2035 target which is aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C and to achieving net zero by 2050. Deep emissions cuts are urgently needed by 2035, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) 2023 report indicating that global emissions levels must be slashed by at least 60 per cent relative to 2019 to keep the 1.5°C limit within reach.[56] This is a collective goal so it is more difficult to say how it can and should be fairly apportioned across different countries, but it is clear that emissions cuts must be steep in the near term as the final reductions from hard-to-abate sectors will be the most challenging to achieve. Major emitters must go much further in their emissions cuts, and developed countries which were the largest emitters historically have a responsibility to make deep emissions reductions while also supporting developing countries, by mobilising finance, trade and technology-sharing, to do the same. Businesses should also support this economy-wide effort by setting credible net zero targets and developing transparent transition plans which include ambitious interim targets.
Timebound targets
Secondly, these targets need to be timebound and broken out at the sectoral level to accelerate the systems change transformations needed. Key high-emitting sectors include the energy system, buildings, transport, food, agriculture and land use. NDCs should commit to phasing out fossil fuels rapidly in the next six years while scaling up renewables, and electrifying buildings, industry and transport. [57] By setting sectoral targets, governments will encourage their ministries to integrate them into their strategic planning to enable more effective implementation and will signal the direction of travel to public and private sector investors. A good example is the development of Nepal’s NDC implementation plans for the energy and agriculture sectors which used participatory processes and included representation from national and provincial governments, youth, women’s groups, academia, and of course, the private sector.[58]
Address adaptation
Thirdly, ambitious and effective NDCs should build countries’ resilience to the irreversible impacts of climate change, working to reinforce tools like National Adaptation Plans. This third round of NDCs comes after the adoption of the first Global Goal on Adaptation and will be important for cementing national priorities in areas such as climate-resilient food production and building resilience to climate-related health impacts. The updated NDCs also provide an opportunity for countries to assess and quantify their loss and damage related vulnerabilities, enabling them to highlight financial costs and capacity development-related needs to respond to the most severe impacts of climate change. The importance of identifying and responding to climate risks will come as no shock to many businesses, whose supply chains and operations are increasingly threatened by the impacts of climate change, and who also stand to benefit from stronger national adaptation planning.[59]
Investable and implementable
Lastly and above all, NDCs must be investable and therefore deliverable. Financing climate action is one of the main challenges countries have experienced in setting and delivering their NDCs. World Resources Institute (WRI) analysis indicates that current climate finance is insufficient to implement even a subset of NDCs. In August 2023, 91 developing countries estimated that they will need a total of $4.5 trillion to achieve the climate actions in their NDCs, of which $1.6 trillion is needed to deliver ‘conditional’ NDC pledges, vastly exceeding the current $100 billion pledge which is due to be updated at COP29.[60]
Businesses are also seeking investable NDCs. The UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Simon Stiell, has said, NDCs should “be implementable, unlock finance, kick-start transformative developments, and ensure that no one is left behind”.[61] Businesses know this and have been increasingly calling for consistency and clarity in climate policy to create certainty to unlock investment finance to deliver on climate action plans.[62] To deliver this, a whole-of-society approach to NDCs is needed with private sector entities brought on board in order to help develop and fund feasible NDC implementation plans via public–private partnership.[63]
Setting out the specifics of the Global Goal on Adaptation
What is the state of play on adaptation?
As many as 3.6 billion people, almost half the global population, are considered highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, whether from droughts, floods, storms, heat stress, or food insecurity, necessitating urgent climate adaptation action.[64] In response, the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience agreed at COP28 expanded on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) which was established under the Paris Agreement to enhance the world’s adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change [65] The new framework aims to improve accountability by enabling measurement of progress towards the GGA.[66] It emphasises the centrality of people, livelihoods and wellbeing, and prioritises certain sectors with 2030 targets including water, food and agriculture, health, infrastructure and more to raise resilience.[67] Looking ahead, the framework calls for all countries to have a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) in place by 2030, and establishes a two-year timeline for the development of measurable indicators.
What progress needs to be made on adaptation at COP29?
The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience was an important start, but it lacked measurable targets, including measures to mobilise finance, technology, and capacity building for adaptation (ie means of implementation). These will all need to be resolved by 2025 under the UAE–Belem work programme, a two-year programme for measuring progress. The overarching targets set out in the Framework which have yet to be quantified include: all countries to have mapped their climate hazards, exposure risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes to inform their NAPs by 2030; all countries to have progressed implementing their NAPs by 2030 and reduced the social and economic impacts of key climate hazards; and all countries to have designed and operationalised systems for monitoring and evaluating progress against their NAPs. Importantly, the global stocktake urged countries to have NAPs in place by 2025 and to have made progress on their implementation by 2030, increasing the urgency compared to the initial 2030 goal set out in the GGA.[68]
While these goals are helpful, the lack of specific and measurable underlying indicators makes it difficult to track on-the-ground action and assess progress against the GGA, hence the development of indicators will need to be advanced at COP29. The metrics used will need to be adaptable to different regional contexts via a bottom-up approach, and should incorporate a wide range of variables including environmental, social and economic factors.[69] The agreement of a specific financing target for adaptation will also be critical. This adaptation finance target will need to respond to the doubling commitment made at COP28, as well as building consensus around how it can be mobilised, as highlighted earlier.
The private sector can also advance the adaptation agenda by taking action in key sectors including food and agriculture, health, water and nature, and infrastructure as set out in the UN High-Level Champions’ Business Action for Adaptation and Resilience discussion paper.[70] Businesses can increase and direct financing to adaptation through their own activities and blended financing arrangements, while insurance products and loss and damage risk-sharing mechanisms in the private sector can play a significant role in increasing adaptation financing and raising resilience.[71] Effective policy measures are needed to provide the right enabling environment for businesses to act on adaptation and realise the co-benefits, hence the need to push for clear indicators and stronger commitments on adaptation at COP29 to help fill the gaps on the road to COP30.[72]
Ironing out Article 6
What does Article 6 cover and why has it been so challenging?
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables countries to co-operate in implementing their NDCs, namely by transferring ‘internationally transferable mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs), ie emissions reductions between countries, as well as supporting other forms of collaboration with non-party stakeholders.[73]
Under Article 6.2, a country can transfer carbon credits earned from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to help another actor such as a country or private sector company meet its climate targets. Such co-operative approaches have already been put in place by Switzerland via bilateral agreements with Ghana and Vanuatu.
Article 6.4 establishes a new international carbon crediting mechanism for trading GHG emissions reductions.[74] The Article 6.4 mechanism has an associated Supervisory Body tasked with developing and supervising the requirements and processes needed to operationalise the mechanism. In theory, this supervisory body would hold actors to account and prevent risks such as double counting emissions reductions, the production of fake emissions reduction credits, and misrepresentation as permanent carbon removal.[75]
Among Article 6’s provisions is the authority to provide a global rulebook governing carbon markets that include the private sector.[76] Many stakeholders argue that carbon markets are an important tool for reaching global climate goals by enabling the trade of carbon credits generated by the reduction or removal of GHGs in the atmosphere, but this will only work if they are high-integrity carbon credits.[77] Failure to deliver this high integrity baseline, alongside scepticism in the underlying logic, has led to a growing critique of voluntary carbon markets and offset schemes in particular.[78] The Integrity Council for the voluntary carbon market has published a set of Core Carbon Principles to establish a global benchmark for high-integrity carbon credits around governance, emissions impact and sustainable development.[79]
The whole area of carbon credits, voluntary carbon markets and carbon trading is highly contentious. In the best-case scenario, Article 6 could provide much-needed incentives for countries and non-party stakeholders like businesses to increase their climate ambitions and lower the cost of emissions reductions. In the worst case scenario, the rules could allow the world’s largest emitters to trade unreliable and unverifiable emissions reductions credits which avoid the need to reduce actual emissions at the source, thereby weakening ambition.[80] The contentiousness of this topic has translated to repeated slow progress and deadlock in this area, and at COP28 there was a breakdown of talks meaning no decisions related to Article 6.2 or Article 6.4 were adopted, sending a poor signal for the future of carbon markets.
The operationalisation of the Article 6.4 carbon crediting mechanism has been delayed, with some viewing it as a significant missed opportunity to implement international carbon markets, as well as the chance to set a high bar on environmental integrity and human rights.[81] Article 6.4 has become increasingly politicised, undermining the development of a robust crediting mechanism which investors can rely on – which is one reason why voluntary carbon markets are seeing a decline in trading. Companies interested in the potential of trading such credits will need to follow how article 6 negotiations progress and will be keen for clarity on what high-integrity credits should look like.
Summary
Global action is largely off track to keep the original Paris Agreement goal of keeping warming below 1.5°C alive. This COP provides an opportunity to raise ambition that the world cannot afford to miss, even if expectations of what it can deliver are lower than some such summits. Azerbaijan needs to use its Presidency to materially build on what was achieved at COP28 and to prove that even though they are a petrostate, they can be ambitious on climate policy. The outcomes will, no doubt, be influenced by the challenging geopolitical landscape, with so many nations going to the polls this year, but the pressures of climate change will continue to ramp up in all political weathers.
A major indicator that such progress is possible will be the NCQG negotiations and whether they result in a robust post-2025 climate financing goal which responds to the needs of developing countries, enabling stronger action on mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. However, the extent to which the negotiations comprehensively address the quantity, quality, timeframes, scope, contributors and transparency of the climate financing remains to be seen.
COP29 will also be the last major international moment to push countries to develop more ambitious NDCs, and the extent to which progress is made here will be telling. It is likely that the most committed countries, such as Azerbaijan and Brazil, will submit their NDCs in November at COP29. If these are ambitious, they could set an example and provide an advocacy opportunity to encourage other countries to demonstrate similarly high levels of commitment.
Finally, the fine print for many work programmes will also need to be ironed out at COP29, namely the specifics of the GGA to ensure progress on adaptation can be measured and countries held accountable; as well as decisions adopted on Article 6 which help to build a robust and well-regulated international carbon market.
The private sector has a key role to play in the outcomes of these negotiations through calling for greater ambition, both in the lead-up to and during the COP. Business can accelerate climate action in the real economy through its own actions and investments, and through advocating a stronger policy and regulatory environment from governments. Campaigns, such as the Fossil to Clean campaign which calls for an accelerated shift from fossil fuels to clean energy, offer a powerful vehicle for private sector impact.
COPs cannot substitute for progress in national policymaking and implementation but they are the primary platform for building international consensus on how to address the ever-worsening climate crisis, and now more than ever, there is no time for a wasted COP.
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The University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership - CISL, is an impact-led institute within the University of Cambridge that activates leadership globally to transform economies for people, nature and climate. Through its global network and hubs in Cambridge, Cape Town and Brussels, CISL works with leaders and innovators across business, finance and government to accelerate action for a sustainable future. Trusted since 1988 for its rigour and pioneering commitment to learning and collaboration, the Institute creates safe spaces to challenge and support those with the power to act.
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Citing this report:
University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL). (2024). Finance, climate action plans and carbon markets: What to expect from COP29. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership.
Authors and acknowledgments
End notes
[1] https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop
[2] The Paris Agreement is a legally binding international treaty on climate change. It was adopted by 196 Parties at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) in Paris, France, on 12 December 2015. It entered into force on 4 November 2016. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement
[3] https://cop28.com/UAEconsensus
[4] https://unfccc.int/loss-and-damage-fund-joint-interim-secretariat
[5] https://unfccc.int/topics/global-stocktake
[6] At COPs, the COP President ensures the observance of rules of procedure and works with country delegations to reach consensus on key issues.
[8] https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs
[9] The 2015 Paris Agreement Article 7 established, for the first time, a Global Goal on Adaptation, to enhance adaptative capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change, “with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response” in the context of the mitigation goal of keeping temperature rise to a maximum of 2°C or 1.5°C. https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/gga
[10] Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognises that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary co-operation in the implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity. https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/cooperative-implementation
[11] global_leadership_summit_2024_insights.pdf (cam.ac.uk)
[12] https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/climate-change-funding-talks-stuck-ahead-cop29-summit-2024-06-13/
[13] https://www.eenews.net/articles/how-trump-could-exit-the-paris-climate-deal-and-thwart-reentry/
[14] Businesses can support this through signing up to the Fossil to Clean campaign here: https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/fossil-to-clean/
[15] Global Stocktake reports highlight urgent need for accelerated action to reach climate goals | United Nations
[17] https://www.cop28.com/en/news/2024/02/COP28-launches-The-COP-Presidencies-Troika
[18] Eg https://www.context.news/net-zero/backlash-as-uae-oil-boss-picked-to-lead-cop28-climate-summit
[19] Eg https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/07/azerbaijan-bid-to-host-cop29-00130712
[20] Azerbaijan - Market Overview (trade.gov)
[21] https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-president-ilham-aliyev-cop29-climate-change-gas/
[22] https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/cop29-host-country-priming-pumps-huge-hike-gas-production/
[23] Oil industry veteran to lead next round of Cop climate change summit | Climate crisis | The Guardian
[24] Newly elected leaders to be held to same climate obligations, says Cop29 chief | Cop29 | The Guardian
[25] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/mar/12/cop29-bridges-diverging-north-and-south-15c-in-reach
[26] https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/national-adaptation-plans
[27] COP29: Babayev says 1.5C goal will be 'guiding compass' for Baku Summit | BusinessGreen News
[28] The High- Level Champion connects the work of governments with the many voluntary and collaborative actions taken by cities, regions, businesses and investors. Nations decided to appoint two High Level Champions. They have a mandate to enhance ambition and strengthen the engagement of non-State actors in supporting Parties, working with the Marrakech Partnership, to deliver the goals of the Paris Agreement. https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/un-climate-change-high-level-champions/
[29] 'Advance inclusiveness': COP29 Climate Champion Nigar Arpadarai sets out priorities for Baku talks | BusinessGreen News
[30] Nigar Arpadarai: Attracting business to COP29 among priority tasks | Report.az
[31] https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/azerbaijans-civil-society-crackdown-intensifies-ahead-of-cop29/
[33] Rich countries hit $100bn climate finance goal two years late, data shows | Climate finance | The Guardian
[34] https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/19150727-en.pdf?expires=1718200694&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=1EE137D288A25D31AF970AA53D7C8FEC
[35] act2025-cop29-call-to-action.pdf (environmentaldocuments.com)
[36] https://www.climatechangenews.com/2024/02/20/countries-draw-battle-lines-for-talks-on-new-climate-finance-goal/
[37] Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its fifth session, held in the United Arab Emirates from 30 November to 13 December 2023. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session | UNFCCC
[38] https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/IHLEG-Finance-for-Climate-Action-1.pdf
[39] Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2023.pdf (climatepolicyinitiative.org)
[40] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/MAHWP2_second_update.pdf
[41] https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/State-and-Trends-in-Climate-Adaptation-Finance-2023_WEB.pdf
[42] Adaptation Gap Report 2023 | UNEP - UN Environment Programme
[43] act2025-cop29-call-to-action.pdf (environmentaldocuments.com)
[44] Integrated Assessment for Identifying Climate Finance Needs for Loss and Damage: A Critical Review | SpringerLink
[45] https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2023/cc231225.htm
[46] Tensions rise over who will donate to new climate finance goal (climatechangenews.com)
[47] https://unfccc.int/resource/ccsites/zimbab/conven/text/annex2.htm
[48] A-Climate-Finance-Framework_IHLEG-Report-2-SUMMARY_0.pdf (globalinfrafacility.org)
[49] A-Climate-Finance-Framework_IHLEG-Report-2-SUMMARY_0.pdf (globalinfrafacility.org)
[50] Executive summary – Financing Clean Energy Transitions in Emerging and Developing Economies – Analysis - IEA
[51] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/mar/12/newly-elected-leaders-climate-obligations-cop29-chief-un-summit-mukhtar-babayev
[52] https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/climate-finance-shadow-report-2023-621500/
[53] The Paris Agreement | UNFCCC
[54] Building Support for More Ambitious National Climate Action Plans | UNFCCC
[55] What are NDCs and how do they drive climate action? | Climate Promise (undp.org)
[56] https://www.wri.org/insights/2023-ipcc-ar6-synthesis-report-climate-change-findings
[57] https://www.wri.org/insights/next-ndcs-5-point-plan?apcid=0065df786aa39963db3b7c02&utm_campaign=wriclimate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=climate-digest-2024-04
[58] Climate Promise Global Progress Report 2022.pdf (undp.org)
[59] Climate disruption to global supply chains could lead to $25 trillion net losses by mid-century | King's College London (kcl.ac.uk)
[60] https://www.wri.org/insights/assessing-progress-ndcs
[61] Building Support for More Ambitious National Climate Action Plans | UNFCCC
[62] For example, https://www.corporateleadersgroup.com/news/partners-join-call-eu-set-climate-least-90-by-2040 and https://www.corporateleadersgroup.com/news/bga-letter-chancellor-autumn-statement
[63] Insights for designing mitigation elements in the next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) | OECD/IEA Climate Change Expert Group Papers | OECD iLibrary (oecd-ilibrary.org)
[64] AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2023 — IPCC
[65] parisagreement_publication.pdf (unfccc.int)
[66] Understanding the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation | World Resources Institute (wri.org)
[67] cma5_auv_8a_gga.pdf (unfccc.int)
[68] act-2025-global-adaptation-action-progress-gaps-what-to-expect-2024.pdf (environmentaldocuments.com)
[69] Understanding the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation | World Resources Institute (wri.org)
[70] https://climatechampions.unfccc.int/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Business-Action-for-Adaptation-and-Resilience-Sharm-El-Sheikh-Adaptation-Agenda.pdf
[71] Ibid
[72] Understanding the Paris Agreement's Global Goal on Adaptation | World Resources Institute (wri.org)
[73] What is Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, and why is it important? | United Nations Development Programme (undp.org)
[74] Article 6.4 Supervisory Body | UNFCCC
[75] Article 6: What is it and why is it so important for COP26? | Climate Council
[76] Article 6 and Voluntary Carbon Markets - Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (oxfordenergy.org)
[77] Climate Explainer: Article 6 (worldbank.org)
[78] Voluntary Carbon Markets: A Review of Global Initiatives and Evolving Models (csis.org)
[79] ICVCM Leading the way to a high integrity Voluntary Carbon Market
[80] Article 6: What is it and why is it so important for COP26? | Climate Council
[81] Article 6: the missing piece of the puzzle :: Environmental Finance (environmental-finance.com)